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Abstract
This paper brings to light the ideas of a pioneering but largely forgotten social critic, C. E. Ayres. In his first book, Science: The False Messiah (1927),
which was written in consultation with John Dewey, Ayres advanced a
forceful and original critique of science and technology. He argued that
technological change was occurring at a pace that had overwhelmed existing social institutions, and further claimed that efforts to solve the problem
by educating citizens about science and technology would prove fruitless.
The analysis presented in this paper outlines Ayres' key arguments, examines the mutual influences between Dewey and Ayres, and makes a case that
many of Ayres' innovative arguments remain surprisingly relevant today.

Introduction
In 1926, C. E. Ayres, a young assistant editor of The New Republic, had completed
a draft of his first book, Science: The False Messiah. His publishers, Bobbs-Merrill,
were enthusiastic but also somewhat worried—the book, which was a blistering
critique of the public understanding of science, was engagingly written and eminently readable, but it was also provocative. Bobbs-Merrill were concerned that
Ayres’ “very saucy” approach might damage sales, especially given that he was a
complete unknown as far as the general public was concerned; and in order to boost
Ayres’ credibility and, hence, future sales of the book, they felt that he needed an
endorsement.1 Ayres thus dutifully set about writing to his friendly acquaintance,
John Dewey, to whom he had previously shown an early draft of the manuscript.
In his letter to Dewey, Ayres grumbled a bit, noting that he was not the sort of
person who liked “sidling up to be patted on the head.”2 But he then asked for the
endorsement, commenting to Dewey that “the book is your stuff, however wildly
perverted.”3 Having long been convinced of Ayres’ promise as a scholar, and having already given critical but positive feedback on the early chapters that Ayres had
sent him, Dewey agreed to write some favorable text for the book jacket.4
Education and Culture 29 (2) (2013): 159-179

159

160

David I. Waddington

Undoubtedly, from Dewey’s perspective, his exchange with Ayres was not
especially momentous. In the 1920s, at the height of his fame as America’s leading
public intellectual, Dewey would have received many requests for favors. Yet as I
will argue below, Ayres’s work did, in fact, have a meaningful impact on Dewey.
More importantly, though, Ayres’ work was innovative in its own right; although
it was, in a very significant sense, “Dewey’s stuff,” it was also a pioneering effort. In
a time when science was coming into its own in the public eye and the philosophy
of science (let alone the philosophy of social science) was still nascent, Ayres was
a thoughtful, incisive critic of science and technology. His method, as I will show,
was a Deweyan one, but Ayres’ interpretation of science and technology is genuinely original and substantially less optimistic than that of Dewey.
This analysis will proceed in the following manner. Given that, even amongst
Dewey scholars, little is known about Ayres, I will begin by presenting a short
biographical sketch. This will be followed by an exposition of the core aspects of
the argument offered in Science: The False Messiah. I will then explain how Ayres’
analysis is Deweyan in its overall orientation—specifically, I will argue that Ayres
adopts three important elements of Dewey’s analysis in Experience and Nature. Finally, I will speculate about how Ayres’ analysis may have had an effect on Dewey.
In sum, in addition to exploring the nature of Ayres’ interactions with Dewey, I
hope to highlight the originality of Ayres’ account of science and technology, which
remains relevant today and in fact anticipated later developments in the field of
science studies in a number of important ways.

Who was C. E. Ayres?
Ayres was born in Lowell, Massachusetts in 1891, in a strictly religious Baptist family. After a brilliant career as an undergraduate at Brown, he first came to Dewey’s
attention in 1916, when he was a doctoral student in philosophy at the University
of Chicago. He applied for a dissertation fellowship at Columbia and submitted
an essay critical of pragmatism. Although his application for the fellowship was
rejected, Dewey, having been impressed with Ayres’ essay, wrote Ayres a personal
letter promising to gather donations in order to create a special fellowship for him.
In the meantime, however, Ayres had already accepted a fellowship at Chicago.5
After Ayres completed his doctorate, he went to work as an assistant professor.
In brief stints at Amherst and at Reed, Ayres proved to be a successful and popular
teacher. However, at each institution he was irritated by administrative changes, and
so he decided to go east to take a job as an associate editor of The New Republic, to
which he had been an occasional contributor over the years. This was a prestigious
position, as The New Republic was one of the most influential publications of the time.
Ayres strengthened his acquaintance with Dewey during this time, writing positive
reviews of Dewey’s work for the Journal of Philosophy and The New Republic.6 Dewey
enjoyed Ayres’ work and remarked that he was one of the “best of the younger men.”7
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Ayres, however, was unhappy with the pressure of his job in New York, and
decided to retreat to a desert ranch in New Mexico, where he settled down to write
Science: The False Messiah. He lived happily in the desert for several years (he sent
Dewey several invitations to visit, touting the horseback riding and hunting, but
also pointing out that there was “no fishing” in the desert), until an opportunity
came to return to the academy when the University of Texas at Austin needed a
replacement historian of economics.8 Ayres soon attained a tenured position and
stayed in Austin for the rest of his career.9
Ayres accomplished a great deal during his time in Texas. He was popular
and renowned for his prowess as a teacher, and he wrote a well-regarded book on
T.H. Huxley. More importantly, he made substantial contributions to economics.
He played a role in the construction of the New Deal, and his most important work,
The Theory of Economic Progress, which was heavily influenced by both Dewey and
Veblen, helped define a significant economic school of thought known as institutionalism, which focused on the interactions between technology and institutions, and,
more broadly, on the social and economic orders that these interactions created.10
His work in this regard was noted by John Kenneth Galbraith, who read Ayres’
books and nominated him as a fellow of the American Economic Association.11
Despite this success, Ayres’ life in Texas was, at times, far from serene. He
had never lacked for frankness, and he deeply antagonized some of the less-thanliberal inhabitants of the Longhorn State with his economic and political views. In
1951, members of the Texas House of Representatives called Ayres an “educational
termite,” suggested he be deported, and subsequently voted 130-1 to dismiss him
from his job.12 Ultimately, the legislature’s efforts were unsuccessful, but these efforts did, if nothing else, testify to Ayres’ tendency to voice what he felt to be inconvenient truths. As I will show in the next section, this tendency was on full display
in Science: The False Messiah.

The Argument of Science: The False Messiah
Science: The False Messiah, which was a comprehensive critique of the role that
science and technology play in American society, begins with a central contention
that was suggested to Ayres by Dewey. That is, Ayres argued that science had, in
the popular mind, acquired the character of folklore, which he defined as “a body
of truth verified by repetition and sanctified by faith.”13 One reason for this faithbased folk belief was the nature of scientific knowledge; anticipating arguments
that would later be made popular by Thomas Kuhn14, Ayres pointed out that most
scientific knowledge was “utterly inaccessible to all but those few who make it their
profession.”15 A second ground for this folk belief in science stemmed from the
“popular” aspect of science that was of interest to the public, which Ayres called
“the lore of science.” Ayres noted that science was capable of accomplishing powerful things—discovering microbes, explaining the workings of the sun—and
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that as a result of these accomplishments, a large segment of the public had come
to believe in science. This belief, however, was not based on knowledge, but rather
on faith—the lore of science, Ayres contended, was revealed to the public in much
the same manner as Moses revealed the tablets: “Scientists emerge from the awful
obscurity of their laboratories and announce that these, their decalogues of physics and biology, are based upon direct observation. We do not doubt them, because they have been in the laboratories and we have not.”16 Science, in the public
mind, was a mysterious, quasi-magical process that had the power to bring about
extraordinary progress, and was, hence, the object of veneration. This argument
about the folk-belief in science is the root of the title of the book; the population,
Ayres felt, looked upon science as a “messiah” that would define new realities and
deliver humanity from its difficulties.
Having established the faith-based character of the popular understanding
of science, Ayres then began to construct an argument that highlighted the dependence of science upon technology. Ayres noted that, in the face of criticism, scientists would tend to maintain that their facts were established by direct observation.
However, as Ayres suggested, the observation wasn’t really direct—it was, rather,
largely mediated by machines. He commented:
Whenever and wherever a happening can be trained through a machine,
and that machine converged upon a dial, and that dial marked off into
standard units, and those units numbered: then and there an exact, scientific, mathematical observation has been made possible.

Ayres then analyzed the example of an oil drop machine, which was used to study
electrons. The public could not discover the electrons for themselves; they were only
available for discovery and inspection through the machine. Ayres acknowledged
that the electron theory seemed to function well; he remarked, “reasoning upon it
as a basis, various additional happenings have been provoked which thus far ‘fit’
the theory.”17 However, Ayres was especially keen to note that the entire theory was
dependent on particular pieces of machinery:
The theory may or may not be “true.” Electrons may exist, or they may be
as mythical as the late lamented phlogiston, the supposed inflammable
constituent of combustibles. The answer will be read in the machines. If
the machines say no, no it is. . . . Thus, the sum and substance of science
appears to be that it begins in machinery and ends in machinery.18

Without machinery, contended Ayres, science “would soon soar into the region of
pure imagination” and become a kind of magic.19 Technology, Ayres claimed, was
the true power behind the throne of science. Whereas the history of science was
usually understood in much the same way as the history of nations—namely, as a
series of achievements brought off by a succession of great men—a more accurate
understanding, he suggested, would acknowledge the dominant role of machinery.
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He commented, “Modern science . . . springs from just one source: that is, from instruments of precision. That is, from machines.”20 This line of analysis, which was
popularized by Bruno Latour in the field of science and technology studies almost
sixty years later21, was unprecedented at the time.
After laying out the case for the dependence of science on machinery and,
therefore, he thought, the primacy of technology over science, Ayres turned his attention to the effect that machine technology had on society. He noted the ease with
which certain technologies (he gave the examples of rifles and railroads), which he
dubbed “technical culture traits”, moved from one society to another. The peoples
who imported the items appreciated only their usefulness, without appreciating
how these new technologies might change their culture in unforeseen ways. This
principle held true, he believed, for all societies, including our own. Ayres commented, “. . . none of us hesitates to install a radio, or to exchange his used car for
a later model. Why should we? Are not these things obvious improvements?”22
The thoughtless adoption of new technology, Ayres maintained, often led to
problematic social change. Inventions like the car and the telephone changed the
way that we live, and these changes were impacting existing social institutions—
the family structure, morality, religion. At the time when he was writing, Ayres
thought that there was a striking mismatch between social institutions and technology. Our social institutions were medieval and our technology was modern,
a mismatch which, he maintained, could not persist. He commented, “it is not
reasonable to suppose that the institutions of the dark ages will consort through
an indefinite future with the technology of the machine ages.”23 Medieval social
institutions were developed in response to a particular way of life, and that way of
life no longer existed. “Our present civilization is a hybrid,” said Ayres, and “like
most hybrids, it shows every sign of being unfertile and impermanent.”24 The dissolution of our social institutions, Ayres reasoned, was already in progress, and
although new values and social institutions needed to be developed in response to
technological change, nothing was being done.
Ayres was also intensely critical of the arguments made by scientists concerning the compatibility of science and religion, and he devoted a significant
portion of the book to analyzing this thesis.25 In this section, he launched a number of blistering critiques, the two most notable being his attack on the attempt to
make religion scientific and his critique of the claim that science still leaves room
for faith. As far as the effort to scientize religion was concerned, Ayres appraised it
as an ill-fated attempt to combine utterly different explanatory systems. Religious
folklore, he maintained, did not lend itself to scientific analysis, and the reverse
was true as well. Ayres commented drily, “Such are the conditions of our life that it
has become necessary to gage the horsepower of the Omnipotent.”26 The claim that
science somehow left the ground open for religious belief (“There’s so much that we
don’t know!”) also left Ayres skeptical. Although he granted that this position was
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popular amongst scientists, he noted that “scientists had the same body of folkways
and folklore as everyone else” and had also duly “given hostages to polite society”
(what would Aunt Mabel think?). Ayres agreed that science was provisional and
conjectural, but this did not warrant the conclusion that a space had been cleared
for faith. He remarked, “Incomplete science no doubt is, but not in such a fashion as to lead any one to go behind it to an antique and alien ceremonial.”27 The
mysteries of the atom were deep indeed, Ayres conceded, and there was much to
be learned about them, but that did not mean that there was any space for divine
caprice within whichever new models of the atom emerged.
One possible consolation of the decimation of religion by science could be
that new scientific discoveries and technologies would emerge which would help
address the social problems brought about by technological change. This messianic belief in science, Ayres felt, was widespread, and he set out to ridicule it. Thus
he commented, “We find it very easy to believe that science will provide. Our oil
may be exhausted: science will find another way; our population may multiply like
flies: science will find food.”28 Ayres thought that this messianic faith was at least
partly based on another problematic aspect of scientific folklore: the Great Man
theory of science. There was a widespread view that a great genius, a conquering
hero of science and technology, could suddenly emerge to save the day. Ayres believed that this image was at least partly due to press accounts that had helped to
create this illusion, and he devoted some space to analyzing a popular book that
he believed exemplified this problem, Paul de Kruif’s The Microbe Hunters. Ayres
began by examining the example of Lazzaro Spallanzani, a bacteriologist that de
Kruif exalted for his dedication to undertaking experiments that would falsify his
hypothesis. Ayres mocked the proposition that verification implied devotion at
some length, comparing scientists to bookkeepers, who, “so great is their devotion to the truth,” that they double-check their figures to make sure that they are
correct.29 Ayres quipped, “In doing as he did, [Spallanzani] behaved exactly as any
sane man or child above the age of five would have behaved. . . . He makes sure that
the lid is on the jam jar before he says, ‘I didn’t do it.’”30
Having presumably disposed of Spallanzani, Ayres proceeded to dismantle
de Kruif’s heroic account of Paul Ehrlich, the discoverer of the cure for syphilis.
Ehrlich had been working on organic dyes that had the unique capacity to stain
certain microbes and not others. From this datum, Ehrlich conceived of the possibility that these dyes could be used to selectively poison microbes. He tested this
idea successfully with a large trypanosome, which he later realized was similar to
the syphilis bacterium. Ehrlich was quite modest about this discovery, attributing
it largely to luck. De Kruif had vaunted Ehrlich for this; according to De Kruif’s
analysis, this modesty was only to be expected of a great hero of science. Ayres,
however, maintained that Ehrlich’s luck attribution was largely correct. Ehrlich was
an unusually able and thoughtful scientist, maintained Ayres, but he was fortunate
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in that he happened to be working on a particular puzzle that had an unanticipated
application. Most apparently great discoveries, maintained Ayres, came about in
this seemingly haphazard way. Once again anticipating Thomas Kuhn31, Ayres
suggested that key discoveries were generally not a product of heroic thinking in
the usual meaning of the term; they were, rather, part and parcel of some kind of
existing tradition of technological or scientific inquiry.
An obvious corollary of this idea was the proposition that science and technology did not produce discoveries on command. In order to support this argument, Ayres turned to the example of cancer. He noted that although there was a
great interest in curing cancer, “so much so indeed . . . that to get a free education
or to prosecute a problem you have only to show your great interest in cancer and
the rest is added unto you,”32 there had been very little progress made. The problem
was, to borrow a Rumsfeldian phrase, that cancer was an unknown unknown—
scientists simply did not know where to begin the inquiry. Ayres commented, “Just
what it is that we do not know or can not do, the lack of which sets at naught all
our efforts . . .no one can state. Consequently we are quite at a loss.”33 Science was
effective at solving well-defined puzzles where the unknowns were known, but
could not deliver solutions to ill-defined problems on demand, regardless of how
pressing those problems were.
From this analysis, Ayres concluded, perhaps hastily, that scientific and
technological change were beyond effective human control:
Inventions come because they are possible, not because they are wanted,
and scientific inventions come in precisely the same fashion; and in the
case of every invention its ulterior effects are what nobody has wanted and
most people would acutely dread. Science as a whole will surely go on to
the discovery of things we little dream of; and the effects of those discoveries will be such changes in human life and civilization as we can hardly
tolerate to think about. To bring about one of these inventions in answer
to our prayers is only just short of impossible. To check the general flood
is equally impossible. In all the affairs of men, science included, the wind
bloweth where it listeth.34

Ayres, who had long since repudiated his Protestant upbringing, was nonetheless
fond of Biblical references, and the end of this paragraph is a reference to John 3:8:
“The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst
not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth.”35 Clearly, Ayres’ outlook on the
future of science and technology was not particularly sanguine.
Yet even given this grim analysis, one might be tempted to think that education might extricate the public from these misconceptions—if one could, for
example, teach citizens the scientific method (Ayres may have had Dewey in mind
here), perhaps people would be less credulous about science. Ayres, however, concluded Science: The False Messiah on a pessimistic note by suggesting that it was
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hopeless to try to educate people to think scientifically. Civilization was necessarily
grounded in habit, he felt, and it was therefore unrealistic to expect people to make
a habit of not having habits—in other words, a habit of being experimental. The
American people, Ayres felt, could only become a scientific people “in the sense in
which we are now a Christian people.”36 In other words, a certain amount of hand
waving about the importance of critical thinking was attainable, and a generalized
educational endorsement might even be possible, but ultimately, the average person
sends down roots into the coarse and fetid soil of common tradition, standardized, institutionalized, accumulated from the dropping of countless
generations of similarly stupid, obvious, and standardized Children of
the Lord. . . . To limpid intelligence the world is a mud-bank of deceit on
which crawls the human race gorging itself on self-deceit.37

From this, one of the parting shots in the book, it’s quite evident that Ayres was not
longing for the Elysian fields of educational reform in order to refashion America
into a science-savvy nation.

Ayres’ Deweyan Inspiration
Ayres is an elegant writer, and although he had an occasional tendency toward the
florid, the key elements of his critique of science and technology are clear. What
is substantially less clear, however, is how this argument is, as Ayres suggested to
Dewey, “your stuff, however wildly perverted.” As noted above, Ayres thanked
Dewey for the suggestion that science should be thought of as a form of folklore,
and this obviously became a key element of Ayres’ argument, but beyond this, there
is no clear elaboration in any of the letters on how Ayres believed he was drawing
upon Dewey.
One legitimate possible counterinterpretation here is to suggest that there
isn’t much of a connection at all between Ayres’ project and “Dewey’s stuff.” Ayres
needed an endorsement, and to have it, he might have attempted to curry favor
with Dewey by suggesting that his project was in the Deweyan spirit. Given Ayres’
general temperament, however, I believe that this interpretation is extremely unlikely. Unlike Dewey, who generally did not adopt an agent provocateur role when
writing book reviews, Ayres had a tendency toward frankness in his New Republic
book reviews—for example, he titled one extremely negative review, “For Hammock
Consumption Only.”38 Furthermore, as the Texas legislature vote would appear to
indicate, he did not moderate his opinions in later life. Finally, long after Ayres
had lost contact with Dewey and had ceased to need Dewey’s help in his career, he
nonetheless continued to write laudatory articles for The New Republic about Dewey.
Given that this “favor currying” interpretation is unlikely, a reasonable place
to look for evidence of possible links between Dewey and Ayres is in Experience and
Nature (1925), which was published just a year prior to Ayres’ book. The evidence
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to be found is substantial; there are three ways in which Ayres can be said to adopt
Deweyan positions: first, he adopts Dewey’s empirical method; second, he hews
to Dewey’s non-foundationalist analysis of science; and finally, Science: The False
Messiah is also a paradigmatic example of the kind of criticism that Dewey calls for
in the final chapter of Experience and Nature. Although Ayres’ conclusions about
science diverge substantially from Dewey’s more optimistic evaluation, Ayres is
Deweyan in his general orientation.
This is especially clear from Chapter One of Experience and Nature, in
which Dewey offered a bold, clear statement of his overall approach. His “empirical method” was a call to take experience seriously as a primary philosophical datum. He commented, “the very meaning and purport of empirical method is that
things are to be studied on their own account, so as to find out what is revealed
when they are experienced.”39 Philosophers had a tendency to identify various other
sources—including underlying material substance, sense data, or ideal being—as
being somehow primary, but this was a false view, Dewey suggested. All of these
supposed primary sources were more and less helpful after-the-fact reconstructions
of experience and were, hence, secondary. He remarked, “As a natural history of
mind, this notion is wholly mythological. All knowing and effort to know starts
from some belief, some received and asserted meaning.”40 In Chapter One, Dewey
further claimed that the job of empirical method was to provide a genealogy and
analysis of the state of belief. He commented, “empirical method points out when
and where and how things . . . have been arrived at. It places before others a map
of the road that has been travelled.”41
Arguably, it is precisely this sort of method that scholars like Michel Foucault would later successfully pursue with books like The Birth of the Clinic and
Discipline and Punish.42 But it was also Ayres’ method in Science: The False Messiah. Instead of lionizing the Great Heroes of science or eulogizing its miraculous
capacity to deliver the goods that civilization needed, Ayres attempted to throw
open the laboratory doors and describe the way in which scientists functioned
on an everyday basis (compare his comments on the nature of discovery and his
analysis of the dependence of science upon technology). Instead of emphasizing its
compatibility with religion or decrying it as an agent of destruction of traditional
values (both of which were popular approaches at the time), Ayres attempted to
draw a skeptical but accurate map of both the nature of popular belief in science as
well as the effects that science and technology were having upon culture. By doing
this, he was performing what Dewey referred to as the “analytic dismemberment
and synthetic reconstruction of experience,” applied specifically to the popular
understanding of science.43
The second way in which Ayres took a Deweyan position can be seen in his
non-foundationalist understanding of science. In a 1927 New Republic article, “Back
to Locke,” Ayres commented,
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In other words, when scientists are doctoring us, or dieting us, or housing
us, or transporting us by the magic of their mechanical control, they have
our confidence. But when they begin to tell us what we are, we are immediately skeptical. . . . As a result, some of us—largely at the instigation of
John Dewey—have taken to calling science a technique. It is an instrument
for doing certain things.44

In the second chapter of Science: The False Messiah, “The Lust for Truth,” Ayres
had laid out a roughly similar position at greater length. Science was a powerful
tool, he conceded, especially when combined with machine technology, but that
did not imply that science was identical with knowledge, truth, or reality. In terms
of everyday lived experience, Ayres felt, science was largely useless, and only became relevant through its manifestations in terms of machine technologies. Ayres
pronounced acerbically, “Science is a contribution to knowledge only if we mean
by knowledge, science.”45
Dewey’s position in Experience and Nature is substantially more refined and
carefully justified than the view that Ayres sketched out, but there are substantial
similarities between the two views. In Chapter Four of the book, in which Dewey
laid out his conception of science, he steadfastly resisted the temptation to declare
that mathematico-mechanical objects (the objects of physics) were constitutive
of reality, and suggested instead that the entire problem of ultimate realities was
wrongheaded. He argued that once we stopped thinking in this foundationalist
manner and began thinking of the objects of science simply as useful tools to effect
certain kinds of results, we could escape from a number of important philosophical
problems, most notably the tendency to crown either phenomenal appearances or
underlying scientific objects with the mantle of ultimate reality.46 Although Dewey
was much more optimistic about science than Ayres, and would have certainly disagreed with Ayres’ contention about the lack of usefulness of scientific knowledge,
he certainly agreed with Ayres’ view that scientific knowledge was knowledge for
science rather than knowledge tout court.
A final way in which Ayres can be seen to be Deweyan in his approach is in
his embrace of Dewey’s call for philosophical critique. In the final chapter of Experience and Nature, Dewey explained that our lives are full of things that seem
immediately good to us. All things, from a fast food meal to a Cezanne painting
are, insofar as we enjoy them, immediate goods. Dewey further maintained that
these goods are, at least in the moment, equal in terms of their goodness; only upon
reflection could we differentiate between them and value them appropriately, and
this reflection is what constitutes criticism.47 When this criticism was carried out
carefully and systematically, or, to use Dewey’s terms, “in the grand manner,” it was
philosophy, and Dewey suggested that science should be one of the key targets of
critical reflection: “Positive concrete goods of science, art, and social companionship are the basic subject-matter of philosophy as criticism . . .”48 Ayres had set out
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to offer some criticism that would clarify the value of science, and as I will make
clear in the next section, although this criticism was caustic (as is clear from the
summary of Ayres’ argument above), Dewey’s reaction to it was surprisingly positive, and it may have even had an effect on his subsequent thinking about science
and technology.

Ayres’ Effect on Dewey
As I indicated above, it is evident that Ayres was a pioneering STS thinker and that
he was powerfully affected by Dewey’s work. In this section, I will show how the
vector of influence also points the opposite way--from Ayres to Dewey--although
the strength of the influence is weaker and some of the connections are more speculative.49 I will begin by detailing the direct, tangible ways in which Ayres affected
Dewey over the years, and then I will offer a broader but more speculative connection between the two thinkers.
Dewey’s initial reaction to Ayres is largely detailed in a favorable review of
Science: The False Messiah that he wrote for The New Republic. In his introductory
remarks, he commented:
Rarely in one book have so many glittering bubbles been so deftly and,
in style, so delightfully pricked. Indeed, at times the brilliance and wit of
form almost conceal the solidity of substance underneath.50

In keeping with his usual reviewing style, after having given a synopsis of the book,
Dewey offered a more detailed evaluation. Dewey did not see “how any thoughtful
person [could] demur” at the main propositions of the book, which included Ayres’
characterization of technology and its effects on society.51 In addition, Dewey stated
that he felt that science, in and of itself, was not the answer to human problems.
Dewey interpreted Ayres as believing that science “delivered only means” and left
outstanding the critical question of how those problems should be solved. In other
words, he validated Ayres as mirroring his own views on these issues.52
However, Dewey was keen to dispute Ayres on one particular point: the possibility and desirability of educating all people to think more scientifically. Those
who are familiar with Dewey’s educational work will know that Ayres’ arguments
are completely opposed to Dewey’s educational prescriptions. The primary purpose
of Deweyan education was to create citizens who were effective thinkers and actors,
and this effectiveness was to stem, at least in part, from a robust understanding of
science and technology; one of the primary goals of Dewey’s system of education
through occupations was to instill this understanding.53 As noted above, Ayres had
been extremely pessimistic about this possibility, and Dewey certainly disagreed
with this sentiment. Although he was willing to concede that many people would
not be able to understand science in its full technical sense, he felt that it was possible to instill a scientific attitude in people. He remarked:
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But there are generic attitudes, like those of facing facts, of analysis, of receiving conclusions hypothetically, which are radically opposed to the dispositions which have supported the folk-lore of the past. It is no easy task to
incorporate these newer dispositions . . . but any implication that the task is
hopeless implies an estimate of human nature which paralyzes human effort.54

In sum, although Dewey felt that Ayres’ book served as a useful corrective to a naively optimistic faith in science and technology, he was not prepared to endorse
the full range of Ayres’ pessimism.
Clearly, however, he did regard Ayres’ book seriously, as he subsequently proved
when he drew upon it and referred directly to it in The Public and Its Problems (1927).55
In this book, Dewey was, among other things, working toward a more thorough
analysis of the problem of scientific understanding. Dewey explained that he wanted
the results of science (especially social science) to be made fully accessible to the public. The scientific enterprise, he felt, had made many discoveries that were relevant to
human life, and these discoveries were changing, or had the potential to change, the
way life was lived. However, the public did not have an adequate understanding of
either science or technology. Dewey reprised Ayres’ analysis here, commenting, “For
most men . . . science is a mystery in the hands of initiates.”56 He then suggested that
if a better public understanding of science and technology could be effected, it would
serve to address some of the concerns raised by Ayres. Science might not “provide”
for the public, but a better understanding of science and technology would, at least,
allow the public to “use and control its manifestations” to some extent rather than
merely “undergo the consequences.”57 Diffusion of the results of science, especially
the results of social science, might allow for a more rational approach to social problems, and make the public less susceptible to attempts to manipulate public opinion.
A better public understanding of science and technology might also lead in
the direction of a more egalitarian, freer society. As things stood, Dewey felt that
scientific knowledge was not applied by the whole public to society, but rather was
inflicted on working people by the rich. He remarked: “At present, the application
of physical science is rather to human concerns than in them. That is, it is external,
made in the interests of its consequences for a possessing and acquisitive class.”58
This appropriation of science by the rich had wreaked terrible damage:
Knowledge . . . has played its part in generating enslavement of men, women and
children in factories in which they are animated machines to tend inanimate
machines. It has maintained sordid slums, flurried and discontented careers,
grinding poverty and luxurious wealth . . . Man, a child in understanding of
himself, has placed in his hands physical tools of incalculable power. He plays
with them like a child, and whether they work harm or good is largely a matter
of accident. The instrumentality becomes a master and works fatally as if possessed of a will of its own—not because it has a will but because man has not.59
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Dewey clearly felt that Ayres had described the problem of technology correctly,
which is why he remarked, “The instrumentality . . . works fatally as if possessed
of a will of its own.” However, he obviously did not feel, as Ayres did, that it was an
unsolvable problem. Dewey thought that the public might one day be able to reappropriate scientific and technological knowledge and exert itself self-consciously
and knowledgeably upon the scientific and technological apparatus. This re-appropriation would imply a more free society in two ways: it would free people from
their mechanical bondage, and it would bring about a society that was capable of
self-consciously directing its own path.
Beyond 1927, limited textual evidence linking Dewey and Ayres means that
it is difficult to the gauge the precise impact of Ayres’ work on Dewey.60 There is
some evidence, however, which points towards an enduring connection between
the two thinkers. In 1943, for example, Dewey acknowledged an important contribution that Ayres had made to the understanding of science:
Dr. Clarence Ayres, as far as I am aware, was the first one explicitly to call
science a mode of technology. It is probable that I might have avoided a
considerable amount of misunderstanding if I had systematically used
“technology” instead of “instrumentalism” in connection with the view
I put forth regarding the distinctive quality of science as knowledge.61

This pronouncement62 is a clear testament to the enduring influence of Ayres’
double view that science is itself a technology and that that science is deeply dependent upon machine technology. As Hickman points out and as Ayres himself
had acknowledged in his 1927 New Republic review, “Back to Locke,” the former
aspect of Ayres’ view was derived from Dewey, and so this granting of credit was
generous on Dewey’s part.
An additional marker of Ayres’ lingering influence is that Dewey continued
to be a partisan of Ayres’ work long after their initial 1927 correspondence. After
Henry Hazlitt (a Wall Street Journal editorialist and prominent proponent of the
Austrian School of economics63) submitted a negative review of Ayres’ Theory of
Economic Progress to the Saturday Review, Dewey attacked Hazlitt’s critique, suggesting that Hazlitt had distorted Ayres’ argument completely in order to demolish
a straw-man version of it. Dewey was blunt in his condemnation: “The thesis of my
comment is that nowhere in the notice does Mr. Hazlitt state either the issue, Mr.
Ayres’ position regarding it, or the reasons given by the latter for taking it.”64 At
this stage in his career, Ayres was well established; he did not need Dewey’s help,
nor did Dewey need to give it. Evidently, Dewey still felt that Ayres was someone
worth supporting.
Clearly, Dewey and Ayres had a number of meaningful interactions, and there
is ample evidence that Dewey was a strong supporter of Ayres’ work. Yet the question of whether Ayres had a lasting influence on the content of Dewey’s work remains
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outstanding. Here, our conjectures must be framed more tentatively. In the years
following his initial interactions with Ayres, it appears that Dewey had a heightened
concern for dealing with the question of science and technology. In Individualism:
Old and New (1930), Dewey quoted Ayres directly and, once again, reprised Ayres’
suggestion that scientific and technological progress were spinning out of control.
Resolving the question of control over technology, Dewey indicated, was a crucial
precondition to the development of a more cooperative society that would be characterized by both new, more corporate forms of individualism and stronger notions
of community.65 He offered a similar, briefer analysis some years later in Freedom
and Culture (1939), in which he noted that although technological progress had destroyed old values, our culture had failed to propose new, more appropriate values.66
This position is, one should note, in contrast to some of Dewey’s earlier writings, in which he adopted a very optimistic tone in his pronouncements about science and technology. In his early work especially, Dewey had a quasi-religious faith
in the power of science—in “Christianity and Democracy” (1893), an early essay,
he spoke of it as a “revelation” that gradually uncovered the unity of all things, and
he suggested that democracy was connected with “the machinery of telegraph and
locomotive for distributing truth.”67 In a later essay the same year, he upbraided
French historian Ernest Renan for having lost faith in science, and expressed his
belief that social science would advance to the point where it would guide daily
practice and decision making.68
This fervent optimism had dissipated by the time Dewey wrote Experience
and Nature, where he commented on the existence of an unduly “abject” admiration for science and its fruits.69 Given that Experience and Nature was published
before Dewey had read Ayres’ draft, one cannot say that reading Ayres was the sole
cause of Dewey’s diminishing optimism about science and technology. Yet Dewey’s
positive response to Ayres’ work, and the number of times he subsequently referred
to Ayres when speaking cautiously about technology, point up the possibility that
reading Science: The False Messiah had a substantial lasting effect on Dewey’s
thinking about technology. Beyond this, it also highlights the fact that Dewey was
far from being a naïve optimist about science and technology, contrary to the allegations made by some of his critics.70 Dewey’s interaction with Ayres gave him
access to criticism of science and technology that cut deeply and powerfully, and
the evidence indicates that he was very receptive to this critique.

Conclusion
Albert Barnes, in a 1927 letter to Dewey, suggested that Science: The False Messiah
would make Ayres famous.71 Evidently, and perhaps unfortunately, he was wrong:
In 2012, as I write this essay, Ayres’ star has long since faded from the academic
scene. His works are out of print, and have mostly been forgotten but for a few Dewey
scholars and historians of economics. Yet in offering this exposition of one of Ayres’
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works and an explanation of the reciprocal influences between him and Dewey, I
have been making the case that he deserves substantially more attention than he
has gotten. His position on science and technology was radical and innovative in
1927 and struck Dewey forcefully. In the 1920s, there was no organized field of science, technology, and society (STS) scholarship; Ayres was a pioneer in a field that
would not emerge until the 1960s and 1970s. Given that the field has come into its
own, many of Ayres’ arguments have now become conventional wisdom amongst
STS scholars—for example, Ayres’ core point that there is a prevailing popular
folklore about science has become generally accepted. There is, however, still a lot
of life in some of his other arguments, especially his contention that science begins
and ends in machines, and with particular reference to his example of the oil drop
machine examined above. As I have indicated, sociologist of knowledge Bruno Latour has taken up a position that bears a family resemblance to Ayres’ suggestions
here, a position which is still controversial today. Ayres’ and Dewey’s contentions
about the non-foundational nature of scientific truth are also very much live issues.
Notably, some of the questions that concerned Ayres are also alive and well
in education. Although Ayres can’t be connected directly to contemporary educational developments, science education is beginning to move in a direction that
Ayres would appreciate. The types of STS issues that preoccupied Ayres have been
on the rise in science education for the last 30 years and are now gradually being
accepted (albeit not without substantial resistance72) in textbooks and curricula.73
In concert with this development, the old definition of science literacy, in which
the core educational goal was to develop an introductory-level understanding of
several scientific disciplines, is being replaced by a new definition that focuses on
connecting scientific knowledge to situations that citizens might actually encounter.
As Noah Feinstein has noted, the old vision of science literacy produced “marginal
insiders,” who understood very little of the core knowledge that the conventional
definition prescribed, while the new definition holds the promise of producing
“competent outsiders” who, while not possessing insider-level expertise, can at least
navigate the seas of scientific information when necessary.74 Granted, even this fairly
modest conception of science literacy might generate an acerbic pronouncement
or two from Ayres, but he would at least be more enthused about this new movement than its predecessors in science and technology education, which combined
naively triumphalist accounts of science with ineffective education for citizens.
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of Ayres’ work, though, is how well it has
stood the test of time. How many books written about science and technology in 2011
will still be worth reading 85 years in the future? I suspect that the vast majority of
these books will seem, to the denizens of the year 2095, quaintly comic. Pessimistic
and corrosive though it is, Ayres’ analysis has retained its critical relevance—there is
almost none of it that fails to apply to the situations we face today. Take, for example,
the belief that science will provide. Today, we find ourselves at the brink of a possibly
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catastrophic period of global warming. Yet somehow we are not particularly anxious,
and this may at least be partially attributable to a faith that science and technology
will descend, deus ex machina, and provide us with a solution to our ills. Ayres’ cancer example is especially instructive in this regard; although the situation is substantially improved in 2011, his 1927 analysis largely applies. We have been desperately
longing for a cure for cancer since Ayres’ time, but despite some significant progress
and a great deal of hopeful fund-raising and grant-generating handwaving, science
has mostly failed to deliver on its promises in this regard.
Ayres’ call for us to reflect on the value of science and technology thus remains current. The gospel of science (and the newer gospel of technology) continues
to win converts and, as Ayres would have predicted, these converts are not always
particularly thoughtful in their faith. Now, more than ever, we need to embrace
the Deweyan imperative to examine the value of science and technology critically.
In ways that are more powerful and pervasive than most of the other goods that
present themselves to us, science and technology are immediate goods that make
extraordinary promises. In other words, the prophets of the new creed have never
been slicker, and popular faith, despite occasional eruptions of misplaced skepticism (e.g., climate change deniers), remains strong. Were he still around today, the
Ayres of 1927 would doubtlessly be holed up in a Social Studies of Science Department, suggesting that it was high time for a few heretics to emerge.
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